MYSTERIUM TREMENDUM- RECONCILING HEISENBERG’S ‘UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE’ IN REGARDS TO THE BALTIC ANOMALY

www.magusmagazines.comADDENDUM: MYSTERIUM TREMENDUM- RECONCILING HEISENBERG’S ‘UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE’ IN REGARDS TO THE BALTIC ANOMALY

            Fundamental to acquiring a solid grasp of any state of affairs is being able to perceive changes in relations. That being so, position and movement are an essential aspect of confirming or falsifying how we perceive variances in association. Our discussion of the Baltic Anomaly makes use of relational study as we probe objective knowledge and subjective experience. By referencing object and subject or evidence and ‘what we understand of the evidence as it changes through time’, we are able to map out and plot the trajectory of the Baltic Anomaly event. As ‘what we understand’ acts as an epistemic conduit, the ontology of the Anomaly continuously changesVis ‘a Vis the changes made in understanding and reassembling the data. Like new puzzle pieces of a puzzle, information is constantly entering the fray to be recognized and included in defining what the Anomaly really is.

            

I know that obtaining a certainty of relations is considered by many to be an impossibility. In fact, object/subject study is ripe with theories suggesting that evidence and ‘what we understand’ can never coexist much less converge into a coherent ontological status. This problem is called Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Relations’ and is best described in terms of particles. According to the Heisenberg dilemma, we can’t know both the position and velocity of a particle at the same time. The moment we pinpoint the exact position of a particle, the momentum or velocity becomes less defined. In other words, if you know the position, then seek to determine its velocity, you destroy what you know about its position. The problem also occurs if we focus on the velocity of the particle. Feyerabend states that, “if by some trick you can determine its momentum with absolute precision, then you not only don’t know anything about its position, there doesn’t even exist anything like a position any more” (Feyerabend 1991). What we know about one, annihilates what we know about the other.

            

It’s easy to see how ‘Uncertainty Relations’ can be applied to the Baltic Anomaly as well. Object and Subject or evidence and ‘what we understand’ are proportional to position and velocity in Heisenberg’s Uncertainty. For example, the more evidence that is collected lends to a lesser understanding of the evidence as it changes through time. As we collect data, what we know becomes less defined because there is more information to work with. Inversely, as what we understand through time becomes more pronounced, we tend to discover less new evidence. We narrow the playing field to include only what we already understand. Subsequently, when ‘less is considered’, the research programme becomes suspended and begins to degenerate. Thus, the Heisenberg problem makes it impossible to create an ontology or plot its trajectory because either the Anomaly becomes indefinite due to discovering more but understanding less. Or, we understand more through time yet suspend our context of discovery. We only consider what evidence is already there. Either scenario threatens to dissolve the entire ontology before it can even be created.

            

The solution to maintaining ‘definiteness’ in our ontology is in measurements. If we measure our evidence, we can discern the relationship between the evidence and ‘what we understand’ at a given time. We can also infer ‘what we understand’ either immediately before or after the measurement. The Object was always in a well-defined position because the evidence could have been measured at any time. Likewise, ‘what we understand through time’ was always well-defined because it was possible to measure in relation to the evidence at any given time. What we understand was there had we the inclination to measure it against the evidence. The fact that both the evidence and ‘what we understand’ could be measured indicates that object and subject were always in a well-defined position. Focusing on one was no threat to the other because they are defined in relation to each other.

            

Another difference between a particle and the Baltic Anomaly is in the identity that is produced by configuring evidence and ‘what we understand’. Although a particle’s position and velocity can be measured in relation to each other, the Anomaly’s object/subject relationship creates an identity-constituting space time. The Anomaly has a personal identity that is lost on the particle. In addition to identity, the Anomaly also enters an alterity and state of vagrancy where in-between occurs while an ontology is being created. An incandescent liminal state, evidence and ‘what we understand’ disassemble only long enough to be re-configured into a new state of Being. We don’t have any evidence that position and velocity of a particle enter into any intermediate or ‘betwixt and between’ state. Furthermore, no interpretation is needed when measuring the distance between position and velocity. However, the Anomaly relies on an interpretation of old and new evidence to form coherent versions of truth.